1 March 2008 -- The Darfur Ceasefire commission (CFC) held its first meeting in 2008 with the absence of one major party. On 29 February, representatives from the Government of Sudan (GoS) and rebel movements came together for the first time this year to discuss issues related to ceasefire in Darfur.

The rebel movements in attendance were:

1) The Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM) Minni Minawi faction, aka (SLA/MM), the only faction that signed the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with the GoS in May 2006;
2) The Sudanese Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid faction, aka SLM/AW;
3) The Sudanese Liberation Army/Abdul Shafi faction, aka SLA Abdul Shafi;
4) The SLA Peace Wing;
5) The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM,) Peace Wing.

The meeting was chaired by Major General Karenzi Karake, the UNAMID Deputy Force Commander (DFC). UNAMID has taken over authority and Chairmanship of the CFC from the former African Union Mission in Sudan (Amis) on the 31 December 2007.

The DFC informed the participants that a restructuring of the ceasefire commission is needed and that suggestions from members are necessary. Colonel van Neel, the CFC Chief of Staff, explained that from October 2007 onwards, the commission has been taking into account 7 representatives from each movement: one representative at the commission level and two at each sector level, which represents a drastic downscaling of representatives. He also announced that the retribution for the commission members would be significantly reduced as well. Neel added that the question of identification for the CFC members is being studied, mainly with members with expired United Nations ID cards.

All movements expressed disagreement with the decisions of the CFC Chairman.

Members, who previously received similar Mission Subsistence Allowances (MSA) to those received by UN staff, asked for increasing the number of representatives and for complete payment of the MSA by Amis. SLA Abdul Shafi’s representative was adamant. Addressing the DFC, he argued: “You say you want to consult with us, but instead, you give us new conditions without negotiation.” He even warned, “We will provide the 7 representatives, but you need a lot more to cover all Darfur. Your mission will fail if you do not follow this advice.” The DFC indicated that the movements were encouraged to use more personnel to carry out the task. He added that a failure of the commission would be a failure for Darfur.

Most outspoken of all participants was the delegation from the SLA/MM whose representative echoed the concerns of his colleagues. “There is no need any more for a UN ID for SLA/MM members of the commission. We have no relations with UNAMID. Those issues were decided between UNAMID, Amis and the GoS. We were not consulted. Consequently, we just ask for the complete payment of the MSA by Amis, and we will not be available on the ground.”

To those concerns, the DFC stressed the difference between the African Union and the United Nations’ processes, insisting that those processes were not flexible. He also reminded the SLA/MM members that they were signatories to the DPA. He declared: “UNAMID is in contact with SLA/ MM leadership and intends to remain so.”

The only absent representatives from this meeting were those of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) under the command of Khalil Ibrahim. JEM’s CFC representatives were declared persona non grata in North Darfur by the GoS. On 30 December 2007, after JEM conducted an attack against the Sudanese Armed Forces in Silea in West Darfur, JEM representatives were arrested by the government of Sudan. They were released in mid January 2008, after the intervention of UNAMID, provided they leave North Darfur towards JEM-controlled areas. UNAMID then flew the members to West Darfur.

Questioning the necessity for all parties to be represented in CFC meetings, the government of Sudan did not respond to the concerns of the Chairman.

The DFC expressed his regrets that no propositions were made by the representatives of the movements to restructure the ceasefire commission and make it more efficient. He argued that if the CFC intends to be a successful body, representatives will have to cease arguing over administrative and personal matters. He added that the members will need to address political and security issues, if their movements seriously consider improving the conditions of the people of Darfur … the presence of the relevant parties is also crucial.

The ceasefire commission is the appropriate tool to advance peace in Darfur. Presently, the commission could be used by the parties to meet in order to put an end to the ongoing fighting between the JEM and the government of Sudan.