05 Oct 11 - Public Lecture by UNAMID JSR at the International Development and Reconstruction Centre

6 Oct 2011

05 Oct 11 - Public Lecture by UNAMID JSR at the International Development and Reconstruction Centre

Public Lecture by Professor Ibrahim Gambari, Joint AU-UN Special Representative for UNAMID at the International Development and Reconstruction Centre
Ottawa, Canada - 5 October 2011

“Prospects for Durable Peace in Darfur”

Members of the Board of IDRC, the Executive President, friends and colleagues, distinguished ladies and gentlemen.

I am delighted to be here today and I very much welcome this opportunity to share my thoughts with you on the prospects for durable peace in Darfur. I sincerely hope that my task this afternoon will stimulate a lively discussion and exchange of ideas that would broaden the scope of our understanding of the conflict and therefore contribute useful ideas to the collective efforts for peace with justice for this troubled region of Sudan. I would like to thank the IDRC for giving Darfur a voice at this event. May I also register my thanks and appreciation to the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Canadian Government for facilitating my visit to Canada. Since our arrival, we have been treated to the very warm hospitality that Canada and her people are well known for and for this I remain grateful.

I bring greetings from the people of Darfur and the African Union-United Nations Mission (UNAMID), responsible for peacekeeping and of which I am privileged to head, and the African Union-United Nations Joint Mediation Support Team (JMST), currently under my leadership and charged with directing the affairs of the mediation process. Previously, these entities, tasked with promoting the course for peace in Darfur, were led by separate individuals, and operated from different locations. However, since the appointment of Mr. Djibril Bassole as Foreign Minister of his country, Burkina Faso, the mantle had fallen upon me to bear responsibility for both peacekeeping as well as peacemaking.

Supporting me in implementing the mandates of peacekeeping and the protection of civilians are women and men in uniform as well as civilian personnel who risk their lives, daily, for the cause of peace. We are now almost fully deployed with about 18, 100 military personnel, just over 5 thousand police officers, including Formed Police Units and about 5 thousand civililian personnel, including national Sudanese staff and UN volunteers. Quite impressive, you might say. However, we are required to keep the peace and protect civilians in an area roughly about the size of France with no infrastructures for rapid mobility and in the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement by the parties. Nevertheless, we strive to do the best possible under these circumstances.

Introduction
The past several months have witnessed critical and historic changes for the Sudan. The birth of the Republic of Southern Sudan altered the geography and economy of the Republic of the Sudan. With the loss of a fourth of its population, a third of its land size, and crucially, a third of its revenue, the Government of Sudan now faces the sizeable task of restructuring its economy, politics and international relations to accommodate these changes. In this regard, the Government is acutely conscious of the critical necessity to resolve the conflict in Darfur as quickly as possible in order to begin the process of national reconstruction and development without the harmful diversions of armed conflict.

Supported by international partners, including the government of Canada, the Darfur peace process reached the important milestone with the adoption of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD) on 14 July 2011 in Doha, Qatar by the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM) and the Government of Sudan.  The Government of Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) were expected to have continued negotiations in order to reach a similar goal but that is yet to happen as the parties have not yet agreed to the terms for further negotiations.  The Sudanese Liberation Army-(SLA)Minni Minawi and SLA Abdul Wahid factions unfortunately continue to remain outside the current peace process and have stated their intentions to join forces with the Sudan Liberation Army-North (SPLM-North) for the purpose of toppling the Government. Sadly, JEM has of recent been identified with this cause, although it continues to express its desire to engage in genuine negotiations with the Government under certain conditions. Eventually, all parties will have to accept the inescapable reality that there is no military solution to the Darfur conflict, no matter how long it takes.

Meanwhile, the people of Darfur continue to suffer from the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement that enjoys the blessings of all parties and actors and stakeholders. A reinvigorated approach to the peace process is therefore required. This approach should be fully informed by the new political context in the Sudan and the inter-linkages of the several conflicts that currently rage in both countries. Despite the daunting challenges, I would say that the prospects for durable peace in Darfur are much better today than in the past. While a comprehensive peace agreement and permanent ceasefire remain elusive, the security situation in most parts of Darfur have improved significantly, encouraging modest returns, although an unacceptable vast majority of displaced persons continue to live in internally displaced people camps. This is a grave anomaly and I have always argued that we cannot permit the abnormal to become the normal.

In my opinion, the key challenges that require urgent attention for the achievement of lasting peace in Darfur would include: determination of the next steps for the Darfur peace process following the adoption of the DDPD,  with particular emphasis on the conclusion of GoS-JEM negotiations and a firm and consistent approach to deal with hold out movements and spoilers; the faithful implementation of the DDPD;  and the establishment of an enabling environment for a credible and inclusive Darfur political process that would broaden and deepen the agreements derived from the process for final adoption by the people of Darfur and the Government of Sudan.

Update on Next Steps
The Security Council Resolution2003 of 29 July 2011 welcomed the Secretary-General’s intention to develop a roadmap for the Darfur peace process.  It requested him “to work in close consultation with the AU, also consulting, as appropriate, all Sudanese stakeholders and the Implementation Follow-up Committee (IFC),” taking into account, among others,  the DDPD and necessary enabling environment for a Darfur Political Process.
 
The idea of a roadmap is not new, as the African Union Peace and Security Council and the Assembly of the African Union Heads of Government on a number of occasions called for a roadmap for a comprehensive and inclusive peace in Darfur, including the immediate launching of the Darfur political process (DPP). The Security Council also in its Resolution 2003 recognized the “potential complementary role of a Darfur-based Political Process (DPP) led by the AU and the UN” and “welcomes the priority given to UNAMID’s continuing efforts to support and complement this work.”

Pursuant to the Security Council resolution, the UN, in conjunction with the AU, Sudanese stakeholders and members of the IFC, is in the process of developing a new roadmap for the Darfur peace process. A workshop is to be scheduled in Addis Ababa with the participation of the AU, the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), the UN, and UNAMID, with the objective of outlining a strategy for the next steps on both the DDPD and the DPP as well as to agree on a joint strategy on the way forward for UNAMID and the AUHIP with respect to this process. The outcome would serve as the basis for the roadmap for Darfur as envisaged by the Secretary-General.  Inputs from the IC partners, including Canada, will be considered at this workshop.  Additional consultations, which are needed to adequately develop and build consensus on the roadmap, are planned, including at the next retreat of Special Envoys scheduled for 19 October in El Geneina.   

Preliminary findings from consultations conducted so far indicate broad agreement on the following key elements of the roadmap: (a) support to implementation of the DDPD; (b) continued engagement with the Government and other movements, including JEM, SLA-Abdul Wahid and SLA-Minni Minnawi, with a view toward mediating a ceasefire and peace agreement; (c) support for internal dialogue and consultations, the security environment permitting; and (d) strengthened coordination mechanisms with international partners acting in support of the peace process.

Update on the Doha negotiations
Although negotiations on the DDPD may not have been perfect, it is regarded as a significant improvement to the previous Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) on the basis of the consultations and involvement of civil society and other stakeholders. Indeed, the All Darfur Stakeholders Conference (ADSC) organised by the Mediation on 27 to 31 May 2011 was aimed to provide representatives of Darfuri society the opportunity to meet each other, along with members of the international community, and to debate and take ownership of the outcome document as the framework for the final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Approximately 450 representatives of civil society, national and state legislative assemblies and political parties attended the conference. All the major international partners of the Sudan including the Special Envoys of the P-6 as well as the Arab League, the African Union and others were also represented at the event.

Since the signing of the DDPD significant progress has been made in its implementation.  On 22 August, UNAMID convened the inaugural meeting of the Cease-fire Commission (CFC) in El Fasher. The CFC has since met on 8 and 19 September and as recently as 3 October in El Fasher, where participants discussed the disposition of their forces and committed to submit all relevant information needed to start the implementation of the final security arrangements.

On 11 September in Doha, the Government of the State of Qatar with the support of UNAMID convened the inaugural meeting of the Implementation Follow-up Commission (IFC), as stipulated in the DDPD. The Commission was briefed by UNAMID and the parties on the status of the implementation of the DDPD, particularly the dissemination of the DDPD and the work of the Ceasefire Commission (CFC). The meeting also deliberated on the financial and logistical requirements of the implementation process, and the need for contributions to the Trust Funds to facilitate timely delivery of the dividends of peace to the people in Darfur.

In keeping with the implementation of the DDPD, the Government issued two presidential decrees: on 13 September, Dr. Al-Haj Adam Youssef, a native of Darfur, was appointed Vice President of the Republic of Sudan; and; on 21 September, Dr. Eltigani Seisi, the leader of the LJM, was appointed as the Chairperson of the Darfur Regional Authority (DRA).  These appointments are welcomed as positive indications of the Government’s commitment to implement the DDPD. LJM had submitted a list of its nominees for appointment as regional ministers by the President, as stipulated by the DDPD. GoS had also established a Darfur Peace Follow-Up Office under the overall leadership of Dr Amin Omar, Chief Negotiator for the Government at the Doha talks.

UNAMID’s role during this period has been consistent and pro-active, assisting the parties in the implementation, and in my capacity as Joint Chief Mediator, a.i. engaging with the parties to resume negotiations to conclude the DDPD.  We have reunited Peace-making with peacekeeping and this would help in ensuring a sustained focus for lasting peace, particularly in organising the Darfur political process. The UNAMID Force Commander Chairs the CFC and UNAMID staff and expertise serve secretariat functions with the IFC and CFC. As always UNAMID is active on ground engaging with local communities and in the dissemination of the DDPD. So far, lessons learnt in all of these are that lasting peace in Darfur cannot be achieved by doing a deal alone with rebel movements and that broad participation and inclusivity, coupled with faithful implementation by the parties and support by international partners are key and necessary ingredients to achieving this noble objective.

Lasting Peace in Darfur: Beyond the Doha Process
The DDPD can best be described as a work in progress which forms a basis for reaching a comprehensive agreement that would hopefully address the root causes of the Darfur conflict.  It would require the support of all international partners engaged in the process, particularly to encourage other hold out movements, such as SLA-Abdul Wahid and SLA-Minni Minawi to engage in negotiations rather than uniting with the SPLM-North for war against the Government. These movements appear to have assessed the current regional instability as a potential opportunity, and have chosen to take their chances to prevail through armed violence rather than through negotiations. I have long advocated that unification among the various armed movements is necessary for resolving the conflict in Darfur. However, I have urged them to unify for peace, not for war. These initiatives can only undermine the gains made and only lead to further clashes and displacement within the local population. International partners with influence to bear on these movements should encourage the dialogue approach if we aim to achieve lasting peace in Darfur.

The Government of Sudan bears a large responsibility for encouraging this dialogue process. A significant challenge to broad participation and inclusivity, regarded as  veritable tools for achieving lasting peace are the security and political situation in Darfur. Although the situation has largely improved and elected officials govern in the three Darfur States, issues of political freedom and human rights remain issues of concern that will need to be seriously addressed by the Government in order to create the enabling environment for meaningful internal political process where all parties, including field commanders of rebel movements may feel secure enough to contribute. Therefore, a forum outside of Sudan, such as Doha or any where else as may be determined in the near future, would still be required, at which these ‘holdout movements’ can engage with the process. However, all such efforts would require considerable international support for meaningful success.

The Government of the State of Qatar deserves special commendation for the unwavering support, commitment and dedication it continues to show for the cause of peace in Darfur. But without the required actions by the Government of Sudan and unified and consistent firm actions from the international community against hold out movements who constitute obstacles to the peace process, all efforts for lasting peace in Darfur may not yield the desired results. The upcoming Retreat of Special Envoys on Darfur to be held on 19 – 20 October 2011, in El Geniena, presents those within the international community focused on Darfur, with an opportunity to meet and develop consensus on a Road-map for peace in Darfur. Without firm and unified response from the international partners, the “holdouts” currently in alliance for a regime change would continue in the un-winnable war, leaving the people of Darfur to bear the consequences of a renewed conflict in the region.

 With regards to the internal political process, one concern is that even if  JEM  joins  LJM and the Government in a adopting and implementing the DDPD, there is not  yet widespread popular support for the document, a ‘’sine qua non’’ for its success and legitimacy. Therefore, a process that serves to build and broaden support for an outcome through the involvement of a large number of Darfuris from a wide range of constituencies is needed. The All Darfur Stakeholders Conference and the civil society track of the Doha process have gone some way towards expanding participation beyond just the negotiating parties. However, limitations in the number of people who can be transported to conferences in Doha and the sometimes violent disputes that have arisen over who should be represented in these events have hindered the achievement of the optimal benefits of such important tool for dialogue and makes holding more inclusive, comprehensive and accessible popular consultations inside Darfur all the more important.

Another issue to be addressed in the interest of lasting peace is the requirement to fully address several social peace issues that could not be deeply death with were either not addressed or only partially addressed by the Doha process. This is because the negotiations have mainly focused on talks between the belligerent parties, with few opportunities for dialogue between other stakeholder groups. Therefore, locality- and state-level conferences held in Darfur that enhance, enrich and deepen the outcome of the Doha negotiations remain an essential element of a comprehensive and inclusive peace process. Here, social peace should be understood to mean an absence of conflict between communities caused by localized issues, such as access to land and natural resources, local political power, inter-ethnic rivalry, or an absence of dispute resolution mechanisms.

UNAMID, the DDPD and DPP
UNAMID will facilitate, in conjunction with the African Union High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), a Darfur political process. It is envisaged that this process would form a natural transition from Doha-negotiations to Darfur based popular consultations that enhance the outcome of Doha. The DDPD would form the basis of the broad based and highly inclusive discussions aimed at consolidating a consensus addressing the root causes of the conflict and hopefully harmonising all international efforts fro lasting peace in Darfur.

In this regard, UNAMID and the AUHIP will continue to encourage the Government and movements to establish and maintain an enabling environment, including by the Government delivering on its commitment to abrogate the emergency laws and by convening an inaugural meeting of a joint security task force.

I believe that essential pre-conditions currently exists in most parts of Darfur to convene initial local consultations with would-be participants in the political process to ascertain the conditions they would consider necessary to advance the political process, including through the implementation of the DDPD. Indeed, serious commitments by the Parties to the implementation of the provisions of the DDPD in a timely manner will go a long way in enhancing the enabling environment, particularly in widening and encouraging the support base for the DDPD and local ownership of the peace process in Darfur. I am convinced that, given the commitments made by both the GoS and the LJM at the inaugural meeting of the IFC in Doha on 11 September, as well as continuing assessments of the enabling environment and the potential benefits created by the consultations on DDPD implementation, the basis for a more sustained, credible and legitimate process is currently feasible in Darfur.

I appeal to the Government of Sudan to take advantage of the current period to set a new course for peace in Darfur. The armed movements should also demonstrate, in concrete and practical manner, their commitment to bring peace to the region by engaging urgently and in good faith in efforts to end the Darfur conflict comprehensively and inclusively.

Conclusion
In sum, the current situation requires a dual focus and approach to supporting the peace process. On the first track; UNAMID would support the implementation of the DDPD. In the second track, UNAMID, in conjunction with the AUHIP, would facilitate a Darfur political process by pressing for the establishment of an enabling environment for meaningful dialogue.  As the Joint Chief Mediator, I will also continue to actively explore all options with the Government and the armed movements to find points of connection to spur talks, while the Mission would also be on stand-by to substantively support negotiations between the Government and ‘holdout movements’, should they commence.

Such an approach would not diminish the ability of UNAMID to implement its other mandated tasks, namely protecting civilians and facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. On the contrary, supporting a ceasefire and the implementation of security arrangements is likely to enhance and complement work in these areas by alleviating protection threats and restrictions to access. Similarly, the potential peace dividends available from early recovery projects and facilitating voluntary returns will also enable UNAMID to more effectively provide support in these areas.

The prospects for lasting peace in Darfur must take careful note of the important political developments in some parts of North Africa and surrounding regions. These events have highlighted again the need for: a) inclusiveness and ownership in the conduct of public policy; b) the importance of guarantying basic freedoms; and c) equal opportunities in building for social growth, peace and development.  The legitimate aspirations of people for democracy, gender and religious equality, justice, human rights, and social and economic inclusion can no longer be ignored or relegated to the distant future.

Finally, irrespective of what form the peace process ultimately takes and the role UNAMID plays, the Mission will not loose focus on its core responsibilities of facilitating access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the protection of civilians in Darfur.

I thank you for your attention.